Recently Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa-Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) only propose a sufficient condition.
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Recently Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa-Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) only propose a sufficient condition.
The objective of this note is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency even if agents have MaxMin expected utility preferences. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) . We derive all the results in Kajii and Ui (2008) has simple corollaries of our general characterization.
KEYWORDS: Interim efficiency, Multiple priors, Maxmin expected utility, No-trade. We consider a model of an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information as presented in Kajii and Ui (2008) . There is a finite set Ω of states. The set of all probability measures over Ω is denoted by Prob(Ω) and we let be the collection of all non-empty, convex and closed subsets of Prob(Ω). The expectation of a vector x ∈ Ω under a probability measure p ∈ Prob(Ω) is denoted by p [x], i.e.,
p(ω)x(ω).
If P is a set in then we let
There is a finite set I of agents. Each agent i's information is characterized by a partition Π i of Ω. Any event π ∈ Π i can be interpreted as a signal received by agent i at the interim stage. The unique event π ∈ Π i containing ω is denoted by Π i (ω). The information is assumed to be correct in the sense that if the state of nature is ω, agent i knows that the true state does not belong to Ω \ Π i (ω) but cannot discern among the states in Π i (ω) which one is the true state. Each agent i has a set of priors P i ∈ which represents his prior beliefs, and a set of posteriors Φ i (π) ∈ for each signal π ∈ Π i , which represents his posterior beliefs after observing π. The collection of posteriors {Φ i (π)} π∈Π i is denoted by Φ i .
ASSUMPTION 1 For every agent i and every signal π ∈ Π i , (a) there exists at least one prior p ∈ P i such that p(π) > 0; (b) every posterior p ∈ Φ i (π) satisfies p(π) = 1.
For notational convenience, given a subset π ⊂ Ω, we denote by (π) the subset of defined as follows: a set P ∈ belongs to (π) if and only if the support of any probability in P is a subset of π, i.e., ∀p ∈ P, p(π) = 1.
Observe that for every agent i and every interim signal π ∈ Π i , the set of posteriors Φ i (π) belongs to (π).
There is a single good in the economy, and agent i has a concave, strictly increasing and continuous differentiable utility index function u i : [0, ∞) → which induces maxmin expected utility preferences as defined by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .
DEFINITION 1 Agent i (strictly) prefers the contingent consumption bundle y ∈ Ω + to x ∈ Ω + at the ex-ante stage if
The set of all contingent consumption bundles that are (strictly) preferred to x at the ex-ante stage is denoted by Pref
Similarly, we can define agent i' preference relation at the interim stage.
DEFINITION 2 Agent i (strictly) prefers the contingent consumption bundle y ∈ Ω + to x ∈ Ω + at the interim stage with private information π ∈ Π i if
The set of all contingent consumption bundles that are (strictly) preferred to x at the interim stage with private information π ∈ Π i is denoted by Pref
An allocation x is a family x = (x i ) i∈I where x i is a vector in Ω + representing a contingent consumption bundle. We fix from now on an allocation e = (e i ) i∈I where e i can be interpreted as the current endowment of agent i. In other words, the allocation e is not ex-ante efficient if and only if there exists a feasible trade t such that
The allocation e is not interim efficient if and only if there exists a feasible trade t such that
In order to provide a characterization of efficiency in terms of primitives it is important to characterize the set of net trades t i such that the associated contingent consumption e i + t i is strictly preferred to the initial endowment e i when agents have MEU-preferences. For that purpose, we need to introduce the concept of active belief. DEFINITION 4 Fix an agent i and a set Q ∈ of beliefs. We denote by Act
Any belief in Act i (Q) is called an active belief in Q at e i .
Since we allow for risk-adverse agents, we also need to introduce the concept of risk-adjusted belief. DEFINITION 5 Fix an agent i and a belief p ∈ Prob(Ω). The risk-adjusted belief RA i (p) is the probability measure in Prob(Ω) defined by
Given a set Q ∈ of beliefs, we denote by RA i (Q) the set of risk-adjusted beliefs defined by
Adapting the arguments in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) we can prove the following lemma. This is the crucial technical result of this note. We provide a detailed proof for more general preferences in Section 5.
LEMMA 1 Fix an agent i, a set of beliefs Q ∈ and a net trade t
A direct consequence of this lemma is the following characterization of ex-ante efficiency.
PROPOSITION 1
The allocation e is ex-ante efficient if and only if
It is natural to wonder if a similar characterization is possible for interim efficiency.
1. THE CHARACTERIZATION PROPOSED BY KAJII AND UI Kajii and Ui (2008) introduced the key concept of compatible priors which is a natural way to construct a family of priors when starting from a family of posterior beliefs. DEFINITION 6 Fix an agent i and a family Q = (Q(π)) π∈Π i of posterior beliefs where for each interim signal π ∈ Π i , the set Q(π) belongs to (π). A probability p ∈ Prob(Ω) is said to be a Q-compatible prior if for every interim signal π ∈ Π i , the conditional probability p(·|π), when it exists, belongs to the set Q(π). The set of all Q-compatible priors is denoted by CP i (Q). Kajii and Ui (2008) showed that the set of Q-compatible priors is actually the convex hull of the union of all sets Q(π), i.e.,
2 See Proposition 2 and Proposition 7 in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) or Proposition 5 Kajii and Ui (2008) . For other sufficient and necessary conditions, we also refer to Dana (1998) , Tallon (1998) , Samet (1998) and Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) .
In particular the set CP i (Q) is non-empty, convex and closed, i.e., it belongs to . Unfortunately, Kajii and Ui (2008) did not propose a "general" characterization of interim efficiency similar to the characterization given in Proposition 1 for exante efficiency. They propose a sufficient condition and prove that this condition is necessary provided that the interim utility of the initial endowment is independent of the signal received, i.e., the following mapping
is constant over Π i for every agent i.
DEFINITION 7
The allocation e is said to have constant interim utility if for every agent i, the utility at an interim stage of the contingent consumption e i is independent of the signal received, i.e.,
Kajii and Ui (2008) proved the following (partial) characterization.
PROPOSITION 2 (a)
The allocation e is interim efficient if
(b) If the allocation e has constant interim utility then condition (2) is also necessary.
A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR INTERIM EFFICIENCY
We propose to improve the latter result by exhibiting a necessary and sufficient condition.
THEOREM 1 The allocation e is interim efficient if and only if
3 We abuse notations by writing
. 4 We abuse notations by writing
In other words, the allocation e is interim efficient if and only if there exists a probability measure q ∈ Prob(Ω) and for each i, a family
The proof will be a very simple consequence of Proposition 1. To see this, we need the following intermediate result.
LEMMA 2 The allocation e is interim efficient if and only if there does not exist a feasible trade t such that
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: We first prove the "if" part. Assume that there does not exist a feasible trade satisfying (4) but the allocation e is not interim efficient. Then there exists a feasible trade t such that
Following Lemma 1 we must have
This contradicts the assumption that there does not exist a feasible trade satisfying (4). We now prove the "only if" part. Assume that the allocation e is interim efficient but there exists a feasible trade τ such that
Fix an agent i and a signal π ∈ Π i . We have
It follows from Lemma 1 that there exists
We let > 0 be defined by
and for each i, we pose t i = τ i . The allocation t = (t i ) i∈I is a feasible trade such that
which leads to a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. We provide the straightforward details hereafter.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: We consider the modified economy where
• each agent i is risk-neutral in the sense that his utility index u i is linear, i.e., u i (c) = c; • each agent i's set of priors P i is defined by
According to Lemma 2, the allocation e is interim efficient for the economy if and only if it is ex-ante efficient for the economy . Observe that P i coincides with
Applying Proposition 1, we obtain the desired result.

RELATION WITH THE LITERATURE
The partial characterization proved by Kajii and Ui (2008) (and presented in Proposition 2) follows from our main characterization result. The sufficient condition (Part (a) of Proposition 2) follows from the following general property.
PROPOSITION 3 For every agent i, we have
RA i • Act i • CP i (Φ) ⊂ CP i • RA i • Act i (Φ i ).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Fix an agent i and choose
We first prove that each r σ must actually belong to Act i (Φ i (σ)) for every signal σ ∈ Π i satisfying λ σ > 0. Indeed, fix a signal σ with λ σ > 0 and any posterior q σ ∈ Φ i (σ). We let p σ be the probability in Prob(Ω) defined by
The probability measure p σ belongs to
implying that
We have thus proved that r σ belongs to Act i (Φ i (σ)).
Now let q be the risk-adjusted prior RA i (p). For each state ω ∈ Ω, we have
where
Since the vector (µ π ) π∈Π i belongs to Prob(Π i ), we obtain that
and therefore q belongs to
REMARK 1 A cautious reader will realize that we have also proved that
The necessary condition (Part (b) of Proposition 2) proposed by Kajii and Ui (2008) follows from the following specific property.
PROPOSITION 4 If the allocation e has constant interim utility then for each agent i, we have
For each state ω ∈ Ω, we shave
.
We let p be defined by
Observe that p belongs to
] is equal to 1. Indeed, since for each signal π ∈ Π i , the support of r π is a subset of π, we have
Therefore, we have q = RA i (p). To finish the proof it is sufficient to show that the probability measure p actually belongs to Act
We let η be the probability measure in Prob(Ω) defined by
In order to prove that p belongs to Act
We now make use of the additional assumption. Since the function π
Q.E.D.
REMARK 2 A cautious reader will realize that we have also proved that
In order to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency, Kajii and Ui (2008) introduced the concept of full insurance in the interim stage.
DEFINITION 8 A contingent consumption bundle x has the full-insurance property at the interim stage for agent i if it is privately measurable in the sense that the restriction of x to each signal π ∈ Π i is constant. Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed the following necessary and sufficient condition when the allocation e is privately measurable.
PROPOSITION 5 Assume that the allocation e is privately measurable in the sense that for each agent i, the contingent consumption bundle e i has the full-insurance property at the interim stage. Then the allocation e is interim efficient if and only if
One may want to compare Proposition 5 with our general necessary and sufficient condition. The following characterization is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 1.
PROPOSITION 6 Assume that the allocation e is privately measurable then the allocation e is interim efficient if and only if
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: Assume that the allocation e is privately measurable. It is sufficient to prove that for each agent i and each private signal π ∈ Π i , we have
. Since e i is constant on π, we denote by e i (π) its value.
Observe that for each r π ∈ Φ i (π) we have
In particular, any posterior belief is active, i.e., Act
We propose now to prove that there is no need to adjust for risk. This is very intuitive since there is no risk. More precisely, let κ π be a probability measure in
Since e i is constant on π, the function ω → ∇u i (e i (ω)) is also constant on π. We denote by ∇u i (e i (π)) its value. It follows that
Q.E.D.
Our necessary and sufficient condition (6) seems to be different from (5) the condition proposed by Kajii and Ui (2008) . Actually, when the allocation e has the full-insurance property at the interim stage, there is no need to adjust Φ-compatible priors to risk.
LEMMA 3 If the allocation e is privately measurable then
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: Let p be a probability measure in
We denote by q the risk adjusted probability RA i (p). It follows that for every state ω ∈ Ω,
This implies that the vector (γ π ) π∈Π i belongs to Prob(Π i ) and therefore the riskadjusted Φ i -compatible prior q is also a Φ i -compatible prior, i.e., q ∈ CP i (Φ i ). We have thus proved that
Conversely, we can always write p in the following form
Since the vector (η π ) π∈Π i belongs to Prob(Π i ) we get that p is also a risk-adjusted Φ i -compatible prior. We have thus proved that
NO SPECULATIVE TRADE
Following Kajii and Ui (2008) we propose to investigate under which conditions purely speculative trade is impossible. DEFINITION 9 We say that there is no purely speculative trade if ex-ante efficiency of the allocation e implies that it is also interim efficient.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 we get the following general characterization.
PROPOSITION 7 There is no speculative trade if and only if
The two general characterization results (Corollary 8 and Corollary 9) proposed by Kajii and Ui (2008) follow from the previous result together with Proposition 4 and Proposition 6. PROPOSITION 8 Assume that the allocation e has constant interim utility, then there is no purely speculative trade if and only if
Assume that the allocation e is privately measurable, then there is no purely speculative trade if and only if
5 In (Kajii and Ui, 2008, Corollary 9) , the condition (10) is replaced by
We proved (see Lemma 3) that when the allocation e is privately measurable then for every i, we have
. This implies that both conditions (9) and (10) are equivalent.
The necessary and sufficient condition (7) imposes an abstract relation between the set of priors P i and the family Φ i = (Φ i (π)) π∈Π i of posteriors. We propose to investigate sufficient conditions relating priors and posteriors to preclude purely speculative trade. A straightforward sufficient condition is proposed hereafter. PROPOSITION 9 Assume that for each agent i, for every active prior p i ∈ Act i (P i ) and for every signal π ∈ Π i the condition probability p i (·|π), when it exists, is an active posterior, i.e.,
Then there is no purely speculative trade.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9:
We only have to check that (7) is satisfied. Assume that there exists a probability q ∈ Prob(Ω) and for each agent i an active prior
Fix a state ω ∈ Ω and an agent i. We denote by π the associated signal
Since the family (λ i π ) π∈Π i belongs to Prob(Π i ), it follows that for each agent i, the probability q belongs to the set
Condition (11) is still an abstract relation between the set of priors and the family of posteriors. However, it is now simple to provide explicit conditions on the way agents "up-date" their beliefs to guarantee that no purely speculative trade is possible. Kajii and Ui (2008) used the concepts of full Bayesian updating. We consider a weaker concept. DEFINITION 10 We say that the set of posteriors Φ i is Bayesian consistent with P i if for every posterior belief p ∈ P i and for every private signal π ∈ Π i plausible according to p, i.e., p(π) > 0, the conditional probability p(·|π) is a possible posterior, i.e.,
As a simple corollary of Proposition 9 we obtain the following no-trade result.
COROLLARY 1 Assume that for each agent i the set of posteriors is Bayesian consistent with the set of priors. If the allocation e is privately measurable (or equivalently satisfies the full insurance property at the interim stage) then there is no purely speculative trade.
This is a slight generalization of Proposition 10 in Kajii and Ui (2008) since we only assume that the set of posteriors is Bayesian consistent with priors, while Kajii and Ui (2008) assumed that posteriors are the full Bayesian updating of priors in the sense that for every agent i,
and p(π) > 0}. 
Q.E.D.
We can also obtain the no-trade result of Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Wakai (2008) as a simple corollary of Proposition 9. These authors proved that if priors are rectangular sets with respect to posteriors, then MEU-preferences are dynamically consistent which in turn implies that there is no purely speculative trade. In order to recall the concept of a rectangular prior set, we introduce some notations. Fix a probability λ = (λ π ) π∈Π i in Prob(Π i ) representing beliefs about the private signals of agent i. Let r = (r π ) π∈Π i be a family of posteriors. The probability in Prob(Ω) defined by
DEFINITION 11 The set of priors is rectangular with respect to posteriors (or equivalently P i is Φ i -rectangular) if there exists a set Λ i of beliefs in Prob(Π i ) about the realization of private signals such that
and such that for every private signal π ∈ Π i , there exists λ ∈ Λ i such that λ π > 0.
the set of all probabilities (p(π)) π∈Π i defined by all priors p ∈ P i . Observe that if Φ i is Bayesian consistent with P i then we have
When the inclusion is replaced by an equality, we obtain that P i is Φ i -rectangular. It is straightforward that check if the set of priors is rectangular with respect to posteriors then posteriors are the full Bayesian updating of priors.
6
As a simple corollary of Proposition 9 we obtain the following no-trade result which corresponds to Proposition 11 in Kajii and Ui (2008) .
COROLLARY 2 If for each agent i the set of priors is rectangular with respect to posteriors, then there is no purely speculative trade.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2: We only have to check that (11) is satisfied. Fix an agent i, an active prior p i ∈ Act i (P i ) and a private signal π ∈ Π i with p i (π) > 0. Since the set of priors P i is Φ i -rectangular, it is Bayesian consistent with Φ i . Therefore, the conditional belief p i (·|π) belongs to Φ i (π). We should now prove that the posterior p i (·|π) is active, i.e., belongs to Act i (Φ i (π)). We know that p i is an active prior, i.e.,
for any prior q ∈ P i . Fix an arbitrary posterior r π ∈ Φ i (π) and let q be the probability in Prob(Ω) defined by
Since the set of priors is Φ i -rectangular, the probability q also belongs to P i . Applying (13) we get
We have proved that p i (·|π) is an active posterior.
Q.E.D.
GENERAL CONVEX PREFERENCE AND SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS
Until now we assumed that agents have MaxMin expected utility preferences. When uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors, there are other modelings of preferences: the incomplete preferences model of Bewley (2002) , the 6 Actually we also have that Φ i is the maximum likelyhood updating of P i in the sense that
convex Choquet model of Schmeidler (1989) , the smooth second-order prior models of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and Nau (2006) , the second-order expected utility model of Ergin and Gul (2008) , the confidence preferences model of Chateauneuf and Faro (2006) , the multiplier model of Hansen and Sargent (2001) , and the variational preferences model of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) . We propose to follow the approach initiated by Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) by considering a broad class of convex preferences which encompasses as special cases all the aforementioned models. Each agent i has an ex-ante preference relation Following Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) we introduce the concepts of ex-ante and interim subjective beliefs.
DEFINITION 12 The set Sub
i Ω of ex-ante subjective beliefs of agent i at e i is
The set Sub i π of interim subjective beliefs of agent i at e i with private information
For any σ ∈ {Ω} ∪ Π i , the set Sub there exists a non-zero vector ξ ∈ σ + supporting the set Pref i Ω (e i |σ) at e i |σ, i.e.,
Fix a state ω ∈ σ, > 0 and let h be the vector in σ ++ defined by h (ω ) = for every ω = ω and h (ω) = 1. Since the binary relation i σ is monotone we get ξ · h 0. Passing to the limit when tends to 0 we can conclude that the vector ξ is a non-zero vector in σ + . Since ξ is not zero we can normalize ξ such that r defined by
can be assimilated to a probability measure in Prob(σ). For any vector y ∈ σ , the inner product r · y is then denoted by r [ y] . Abusing notations we will assimilate the probability measure r ∈ Prob(σ) to its natural extension in Prob(Ω) by posing r(ω) = 0 if ω does not belong to σ.
The set Sub i σ is also compact and convex, therefore it belongs to (σ). We can adapt the arguments in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) 
Applying the Separating Hyperplane Theorem there exists a non-zero vector ξ ∈ σ such that
Letting tend to 0, we obtain that ξ supports Pref • interim efficient if there does not exist a feasible trade t such that each agent i prefers at every interim stage π ∈ Π i the contingent consumption (e i |π) + (t i |π) to (e i |π) in the sense that (e i |π)
A direct consequence of this lemma is the following characterization of ex-ante efficiency due to Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) .
THEOREM 2 The allocation e is ex-ante efficient if and only if i∈I
Following almost verbatim the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 we obtain the following characterization.
THEOREM 3 The allocation e is interim efficient if and only if i∈I
Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) studied the relationships between the notion of subjective belief and those arising in several common models of ambiguity. We propose to interpret the two previous characterization results for the two models of ambiguity studied in Kajii and Ui (2008) . One could also do the same for the other models studied in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) . 
Bewley's incomplete preferences
In this section we consider that each agent i's preferences are defined as follows:
• ex-ante,
• for every interim signal π ∈ Π i , 12 ∀x ∈ π + , Pref
10 For every interim signal π ∈ Π i , a subjective belief r π ∈ Sub i π can be interpreted as a probability measure in Prob(Ω) by posing r π (ω) = 0 for every ω ∈ π. Therefore, we abuse notations and consider that Sub i π is a subset of Prob(Ω) implying that the formula
is well-defined. 11 The Bewley's incomplete preference model is not studied in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) since they restrict their attention to complete and transitive binary relations.
12 If x is a vector in π + and r is a probability in Prob(π) we let r [u i (x)] ≡ ω∈π r(ω)u i (x(ω)).
For these specific convex preferences we can compute explicitly the set of subjective beliefs.
LEMMA 5 For each agent i we have
The arguments of the proof are standard: the result follows from the concavity of the utility index u i . As a direct consequence of Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and the previous lemma, we obtain the following necessary and sufficient conditions for ex-ante and interim efficiency.
PROPOSITION 10 Assume that all agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences. The allocation e is ex-ante efficient if and only if i∈I RA i (P i ) = .
Proposition 10 corresponds to Proposition 1 in Kajii and Ui (2008) which is due to Bewley (2001) and Rigotti and Shannon (2005 
This condition is equivalent to the one proposed in Proposition 11. Indeed, following the arguments provided in the proofs of Proposition 3 (see Remark 1) and Proposition 4 (see Remark 2), we already proved that
• for every interim signal π ∈ Π i , ∀x ∈ For these specific convex preferences Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) have computed explicitly the set of subjective belies.
14 LEMMA 6 For each agent i we have
As a direct consequence of Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and the previous lemma, we obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for ex-ante and interim efficiency presented in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1.
